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Re: [microsound] whoopsy



> A very troublesome issue indeed!  For here we are on a list defined 
> around a certain realm of music and named according to terms coined
> for that realm.


CATEGORIES
by Aristotle
(350 BC)
                                 1

  Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a
common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for
each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to
the name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though
they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name
differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an
animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that
case only.
  On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which
have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common.
A man and an ox are both 'animal', and these are univocally so
named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is
the same in both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each
is an animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with
that in the other.
  Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their
name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the
grammarian derives his name from the word 'grammar', and the
courageous man from the word 'courage'.

                                 2

  Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the
latter are such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of the
former 'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'.
  Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never
present in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the individual
man, and is never present in a subject.
  By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are
present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the
said subject.
  Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never
predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of
grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not predicable of
any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be present in the
body (for colour requires a material basis), yet it is never
predicable of anything.
  Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in
a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is
predicable of grammar.
  There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a
subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the
individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is
individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a
subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being
present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is
present in a subject.